We examine whether credit default swaps (CDS) can be hedged effectively using equity.
Introduction
Over the last decade, the single name credit default swap (CDS) market has grown tremendously both in terms of trading volume and economic significance. This growth has, however, been accompanied with significant controversy. One major concern has been that the market may lead to concentration of credit risk and, therefore, systemic risk (see, for example, Duffie and Zhu, 2011; Stulz, 2009) . The poster child for the latter argument is AIG. By selling protection on a wide range of products, including portfolios of corporate debt, AIG concentrated a short position in credit risk in its portfolio, forcing a US bailout.
An unanswered question in this controversy is whether it is possible for a market maker of corporate credit default swaps to effectively hedge inventory risk in the equity markets.
If swaps can be hedged, then credit market shocks can be dissipated through the more liquid equity markets, reducing the concentration of risk on a single counterparty or market maker. If, on the other hand, swaps cannot be effectively hedged, then the CDS markets may pose an ongoing systemic risk problem. Our objective in this paper is to address this question of whether or not credit default swaps can be effectively hedged in equity markets. 1 Integral to the analysis is the question of whether there exists a stable structural pricing relation between stock prices and CDS spreads. Recent research has noted that traditional structural models of credit risk poorly fit observed credit spreads (Eom, Helwege and Huang, 2004 ) and that changes in credit spreads are poorly correlated with equity returns (CollinDufresne, Goldstein, Martin, 2001 ). Despite these well-documented limitations, Schaefer and Streublaev (2008) demonstrate that the classic Merton (1974) model provides hedge ratios that are accurate predictors of the sensitivity of corporate bond returns to changes in the value of equity. If time-variation in default risk predominantly determine changes in spreads, then their results indicate that structural models should be useful for hedging purposes. By examining the effectiveness to which credit default swaps can be hedged in practice allows us both to contribute to the ongoing debate on the value of structural models of credit risk.
In theory, hedging a credit sensitive security with equity simply requires computing the relative sensitivities of credit and equity to changes in the underlying firm value. In practice, in comparison with other derivative markets, hedging credit derivatives poses special problems. First, there is significant model risk. Although a model is required for determining the hedge ratio in many derivative markets, model risk is especially significant for the credit market because the firm value itself is unobservable. Both the hedge ratio and the value of the underlying asset (the firm value) must be simultaneously estimated through the model. Second, a hedged CDS position is vulnerable to relative pricing errors across equity and CDS markets (Kapadia and Pu, 2011) or lead-lag relation (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) . In such circumstances, not only is a hedge ineffective, but the hedge increases the volatility of the position's P&L relative to an unhedged position. Third, there is considerable evidence that changes in credit spreads are impacted by factors other than the asset value of the firm. For instance, credit markets are illiquid (Longstaff ). The greater the extent to which spreads are impacted by variables not associated with changes in asset value, the less effectively will the swap be hedged through equity markets.
As in Figlewski and Green (1999) , we examine hedging effectiveness from the viewpoint of a market maker, whose objective is to minimize the daily volatility of the CDS portfolio position. In our analysis, we address model risk associated with the determination of the hedge ratio by considering four different specifications to determine the hedge ratio.
First, we use two regression-based estimates of the sensitivity of spread changes to the equity. The advantage of these estimates is that it is easy to control for variables that impact credit spreads but are not incorporated into structural models. In addition, under a linearity assumption, the hedge ratio from the regression is the minimum variance hedge ratio. Second, we use two hedge ratios from variations of the Merton model. The first is the theoretical hedge ratio from the classic zero-coupon Merton model as used in Strebulaev and Schaefer (2008) . The second is a hedge ratio from an extended Merton specification, where the zero-coupon model is extended to allow for coupon bonds. The motivation for using the extended Merton model is that, under reasonable assumptions, the spread on a coupon bond priced at par is equal to that of the CDS spread (Duffie, 1999) .
We conduct our empirical analysis on a sample of 207 single name credit default swaps over the period 2001 to 2009. The period ranges from the beginning of the credit default swap market to the Big Bang in April of 2009, when contract specifications for North American credit default swaps were standardized.
Our primary finding from is that credit default swaps are poorly hedged in equity markets. Across our entire sample, depending on the model used to construct the hedge ratio, the root mean square error (RMSE) of a portfolio of credit default swaps hedged by the stock of the firm ranges from about $16,500 to $17,500 a day for a CDS notional of $10 million. In comparison, the RMSE of the unhedged CDS portfolio is about $18,000 a day -not much larger than that of the hedged portfolio. That is, on average, hedging a portfolio of credit default swaps in the equity market reduces daily volatility by only about 10 percent. Disconcertingly, hedging often increases volatility. The Merton model hedge ratios result in greater volatility for investment grade firms, and the empirically estimated hedge ratio results in greater volatility for the riskiest firms with rating B and below.
The finding is robust. First, it holds across sub-samples of rating classes, for both above investment grade firms as well as below investment grade firms. Second, it holds over subperiods. The best hedging performance is in the financial crisis period of 2008-09, when correlations across all asset classes increase. But even in this period, the reduction in daily RMSE only about 12%. Finally, hedging with equity is about as (in)effective in reducing the tail risk as it is in reducing volatility. The VaR of the hedged portfolio over the entire sample is at best lower by 12% in comparison with the 10% reduction in the RMSE.
Hedging ineffectiveness is not because of model risk associated with the estimation of the hedge ratio. Indeed, consistent with the finding of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) , the Merton model hedge ratios are not statistically different from the in-sample empirically estimated hedge ratios. Consequently, the effectiveness of the hedge ratio in reducing RMSE is about the same across all four models that are used to construct the hedge ratio.
Why then is hedging ineffective? Our methodology allows us to quantify the relative importance of the two other potential explanations. We provide evidence that the lack of integration between equity and credit markets -either because of mispricing (Kapadia and Pu, 2011) or a lead-lag relation (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) , has an important role to play. When we aggregate hedging errors over longer horizons, the volatility of the hedged position relative to the unhedged position decreases. However, even so, the RMSE reduces by only about 21%.
Instead, it is evident that the lack of effectiveness is related to the fact that changes in credit spreads are poorly explained by stock returns. In particular, changes in the VIX have about the same explanatory power as the firm's stock return itself. Across our entire sample, the median R-square of the regression of credit spread changes on the firm's equity return is 13%; in comparison, the median R-square of the regression of credit spreads on changes in the VIX index is 9.5%. The VIX consistently explains variation in RMSE across firms in every rating class, as well as across the entire sample.
What is the implication of our results for structural models of credit risk? Structural models not only indicate which variables are important for pricing credit risk, but as importantly, indicate the set of variables that should not enter the pricing kernel. We find it difficult to envisage a formal role for the VIX to enter the pricing kernel within traditional structural models of credit risk. Instead, it appears possible that the credit market incorporates market fears in addition to the risk of default of the underlying firm.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the determination of the hedge ratio. Section 3 describes our data and also describes the pricing model used to market the spread to market. Sections 4 present the empirical results. Section 5 provides illustrations on the results. The last section offers brief conclusions.
Hedging in Structural Models of Credit Risk

Hedge Ratio
Let A i,t be the value of assets of a firm i with equity value of S i,t . The firm has outstanding debt in the form of a zero-coupon bond of face value F , maturity T , and market value of B i,t . From the absence of arbitrage,
In the Merton one factor model, equity and debt prices are impacted only by changes in the firm value. From equation (1),
Following Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) , define the hedge ratio for the bond, δ b i,t , as the amount of equity required to hedge the bond. From (1) and (2),
where L i,t is the firm leverage, defined as the market value of debt over the market value of the asset, and ∆ i,t is the sensitivity of equity to the firm value. In the Merton (1974) model, ∆ is the "delta" of a European call option with the firm as the underlying asset. In a wide class of models, including Merton (1974) , ∆ is strictly bounded by 1 prior to maturity of the debt. It follows from (4) that δ b i,t is strictly positive, and a long position in the bond can be hedged by shorting the stock.
Merton Model Hedge Ratios
The spread, cs i,t , over the riskfree rate r f t is equal to cs i,t = 1 T ln(F/B i,t )−r f t . From equation (4) , it follows that the sensitivity of the spread to the equity of the firm is,
From the Merton model (suppressing the dependency on
N (·) is the cumulative normal distribution, and
where y and σ are the constant dividend yield and the asset volatility, respectively, and K is the default threshold. In the classical Merton model, K is equal to the face value of the bond F .
For the classical Merton model, we define the hedge ratio for the credit default swap in the Merton model hedge ratio as δ m i,t ,
where D i,t is defined as the CDS "duration", the dollar change in the value of the swap for a one bps spread change. D i,t is determined by the pricing model used to mark the swap to market; we defer discussion on the mark to market model to a later section.
In addition, to the classical Merton model hedge ratio, we also construct a hedge ratio from the Merton model extended to price a coupon bond. Duffie (1999) demonstrates that under reasonable assumptions, the spread on a coupon bond priced at par is equal to the CDS spread. Thus, it may be more accurate to compute the hedge ratio from the extended Merton model.
Consider a bond B i,t , t ≡ 0, of face value F , maturity T and an annual coupon c (as a fraction of the face value) payable semi-annually on dates T n , n = 1, 2.., 2T . If the bond defaults on a coupon date, T n , then the holder of the bond receives either the firm value or a constant fraction, w, of the contracted cash flow on that date, whichever is less. The firm defaults if the firm value at T n is below a known threshold K i . Under these assumptions, treating this coupon bond as a portfolio of zero coupon bonds as in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) provide the value of the coupon bond from the extended Merton model as,
where,
where N (·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, r is the constant riskfree interest rate and
and d 1 has been defined earlier in equation (6) .
Definec(A i,t ) as the coupon rate that results in the bond being priced at par for a given set of parameters and firm value A i,t . The sensitivity ∂c(A i,t )/∂A i,t can be computed numerically. From ∂c(A i,t )/∂A i,t , we can estimate the sensitivity ofc(A i,t ) to S i,t as,
Given the equivalence of the spread on the bond priced at par and the CDS spread, the sensitivity ofc(A i,t ) to the stock will equal to the sensitivity of the CDS spread to the stock. Therefore, defining the extended Merton model hedge ratio for firm i as δm i,t , we get the hedge ratio as,
where, as in equation (8), D i,t is the duration of the credit default swap.
Empirical Hedge Ratio
When a single factor model does not determine relative pricing of equity and credit, then hedging credit in the equity market is no longer an act of undertaking an arbitrage as in the Merton model, but a means of reducing the variance of the hedged portfolio. As in the early literature on the hedging of derivatives with basis risk (e.g. Figlewski, 1984) , the optimal hedge ratio under a linearity assumption can be computed from a regression of the change in CDS spread against the stock return.
Let the empirical hedge ratio, δ e i,t , for the credit default swap be defined as the dollar amount of stock required to hedge one CDS contract. Consider the linear regression of the change in CDS spread, ∆CDS i,t = CDS i,t − CDS i,t−1 on the stock return,
The slope coefficient, β i , is the sensitivity of the CDS spread to changes in the stock price.
To compute the hedge ratio, we convert β i into a dollar sensitivity as follows,
The specification of equation (12) can be extended to include other variables,
where X t are additional variables that might impact the CDS spread. In line with previous research (e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001), we include firm-specific variables (changes in leverage and equity volatility), index equity and option market variables (past S&P 500 return, change in VIX) and interest rate market variables (changes in 10-year
Treasury rate and slope of the yield curve).
Below, we will estimate and use the empirical hedge ratio both in-sample and outof-sample (the latter through a rolling regression). Although the in-sample hedge ratio cannot be used in practice, it will serve as a useful benchmark to understand the potential effectiveness of hedging credit risk in the equity markets.
Hedging Effectiveness
As in Figlewski and Green (1999) , we assume that the objective of the financial institution is to minimize the daily volatility of its hedged CDS portfolio position. Suppose that the market maker holds a portfolio of CDS contracts of N t names, and each swap is hedged with its corresponding stock. On each date t, the mean portfolio hedging error, e t , is computed as the average hedging error over the portfolio as follows,
where c ∈ {1, 2} denotes whether the position holds the CDS short (c = 1) or long (c = 2).
We alternate daily between long and short positions to minimize the impact of non-linearity on the hedge. CV i,t ≡ CV(CDS i,t ) is the cash settlement, or mark to market, value of the swap. δ i,t is the dollar amount of equity of firm i required to hedge one CDS contract at time t, computed either from empirically observed credit-equity sensitivity or from the Merton model as discussed in previous subsections. P i,t is the stock price at time t and Div i,t is the cash dividend received at time t.
Following Bertsimas, Kogan and Lo (2000), we use root-mean-squared error (RMSE) as the summary statistic for the hedging error, where RMSE =
The RMSE is equal to the standard deviation when the mean hedging error is zero. For comparison, we also compute the RM SE of the portfolio when the swap is not hedged, i.e., when δ i,t ≡ 0.
3 Data and Implementation
Data
We get our data on credit default swap spreads ( Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our sample. Across rating classes, the average CDS spread increases from 52.9 bps for A rated firms to 605.5 bps for B rated firms. As would be expected, higher rated firms are larger and have lower leverage.
Market capitalization ranges from 46.8 billion dollars to 3.9 billion dollars, and leverage from 0.14 to 0.38 across the rating classes. Panel B reports the summary statistics of daily changes in CDS spread. The average daily spread change for the whole sample is 0.48 bps.
Daily spread changes are positive on average in line with the overall increase in credit risk over this period. Spread changes for lower rated classes are larger and more volatile.
Merton Model Implementation
To estimate the asset volatility and firm value, we follow Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) to jointly solve for the asset value and volatility by iterating the following two equations over a rolling one-year period,
As is now standard, the default threshold, K i , is defined as the sum of the firm's book value Panel A of Table 1 also reports the average asset volatilities estimated through the above procedure. The average asset volatility over our sample period is 31%, ranging from 28% to 35%. As would be expected, the higher rated firms have lower asset volatility.
CDS Pricing Model
We use the ISDA CDS Standard model to mark the credit default swap to market. Documentation of the model as well as the source code for the model is available at www.cdsmodel.com.
The provider of our CDS quotes, Markit, maintains an implementation (Markit Converter)
as does Bloomberg ("CDSW"). Using the model, we define the duration D i,t as the average change in the mark to market value for a ± 1 bps change in spread as follows,
The change in the value of the CDS will depend on the level of the spread. Figure 1 plots the relation between the duration and the level of the spread. For example, when the spread is below 250 bps, a one bps change in an investment grade swap initially at par results in a change in the settlement value of the CDS of between $4,000 and $4,500 for a notional of $10 mm. The computed duration, D i,t is used to estimate the hedge ratio in equations (8), (11), and (13).
Results
Hedge Ratio
We begin by reporting the estimated hedge ratios for each of the four specifications discussed earlier, viz., the classical and extended Merton models, and the empirical hedge ratio from an univariate and multivariate specifications, respectively.
Merton Model Hedge Ratio
On each date, t, we compute the hedge ratio for the rating class as follows. First, we compute spreads and sensitivities on a firm-by-firm basis for the classical and extended Merton models. Then, for each day and each rating class, we calculate the average spread and sensitivities across all firms for the rating class. The hedge ratio is now computed as the product of the average sensitivity and duration, where the duration is calculated at the average observed CDS spread for each rating class on each day. The hedge ratio for the rating class is finally used to determine the daily hedge for each firm in that rating class.
Using the hedge ratio for the rating class reduces estimation noise. When we compute the hedge using the firm-specific sensitivity and spread, the RMSE is higher and the hedge is less effective. Table 3 that the Merton model underestimates bond spreads by about 50%. The pricing error in our calibration of classical Merton ranges from -47% to -71% across the rating classes, and from -31% to -56% for the extended Merton.
Next, consider the sensitivity of the spread to the stock return, and corresponding hedge ratios. The average sensitivity of the spread to equity computed with the extended Merton models, respectively. The sensitivity of the spread to the stock return increases monotonically as the rating declines. For example, the hedge ratio for BB firms is about two-fold that for BBB firms.
Empirical Hedge Ratio
Next, we estimate the slope coefficient β in the univariate specification of equation (12) and the multivariate specification of (14), respectively. We estimate β through a panel regression allowing for firm effects using weekly changes in CDS spreads and stock return.
β estimated from a weekly regression results in lower hedging errors than if estimated from daily or monthly spread changes. Table 3 reports the results. Across all rating classes, the coefficient on the stock return is negative and statistically significant at the highest levels. The coefficient of determination for the univariate specification ranges from 9.6% to 12.7%, and for the multivariate specification from 10.4% to 16.0%. As first observed by
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and verified in subsequent literature, it is difficult to explain changes in spreads.
For the univariate model, the sensitivity of spread changes to the stock return ranges from 0.70 bps for firms rated ≥ A to 4.22 bps for firms rated ≤ B. For the multivariate model, excepting firms rated B or below, the magnitude of the sensitivity is lower. For example, the slope coefficient of rating BBB is 0.63 bps for the multivariate regression, only half of 1.29 bps for the univariate specification. Following the procedure in Merton hedge ratio, the duration at the average CDS spread level for each rating class on each day is used to calculate the empirical hedge ratios. Table 3 
where δ m j,t is the Merton model hedge ratio for rating j at time t. The null hypothesis that the empirical sensitivity is not statistically different from that estimated from the Merton models, β h j = 1, is not rejected for any rating class for the extended Merton model. The classical Merton model fares slightly worse, rejecting the hypothesis for firms of rating class BB and below. Overall, our results are are consistent with Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) that the empirically estimated sensitivities are close to those estimated from the Merton models. That is, there does not appear to be significant model risk in the estimation of the hedge ratios. Table 4 reports RMSE of the daily hedging errors under each of the four hedge ratios. The RMSE of the unhedged position serves as a benchmark. The mean hedging error is close to zero, so the RMSE can also be interpreted as the volatility of the market maker's daily P&L.
Hedging Effectiveness
RMSE across Models
As shown in panel A of Table 4 , the average RMSE across the entire sample ranges from $16,544 to $17,497 across the four hedge ratios, with the lowest (highest) hedging error arising from the hedge ratio estimated from the empirical multivariate (classical Merton) specification. Across the entire sample, the maximum reduction in RMSE is 9.8%.
How well does the Merton model perform relative to the empirical multivariate hedge ratio? The RMSE for the extended Merton model over the entire sample is $17,353, only about 5% higher than the RMSE from the multivariate specification. Interestingly, the RMSE from the classical Merton model is also about the same as that for the extended Merton model, differing by less than 1%, even though the hedge ratio for the extended Merton model hedge ratios are closer to that for the multivariate empirical hedge ratio.
Overall, on average, both the Merton models are about as useful for hedging purposes, and their hedging effectiveness is close to that of the empirically estimated hedge ratios.
Across rating classes, we see wider differences across the models. The hedge ratio from the multivariate empirical model performs better for higher rating classes than either of the hedge ratios from the Merton models, but its performance deteriorates for the lowest rating Overall, our first set of findings supports Schaefer and Streulaev's conclusion that Merton model hedge ratios are not different from those estimated from data. On average, across the entire sample, Merton model hedge ratios result in RMSE of about the same order of magnitude as the empirical hedge ratio, and within sub-samples, often improves upon the latter.
Hedging vs. Non-Hedging
How effective is the hedge from the four models in reducing volatility of the market maker's CDS portfolio? If credit default swaps can be perfectly hedged, then hedging in the equity market would reduce the volatility of the CDS portfolio to zero. We can evaluate the effectiveness of the hedge by considering the extent to which the volatility of the hedged CDS portfolio is lower than the volatility of the unhedged portfolio. The volatility (RMSE) of the unhedged portfolio is reported in the first column of Table 4 . Surprisingly, as can be observed from Panel A, the RMSE of the unhedged portfolio of $18,341 over the entire sample is not much different from that of the best hedged position. At best, across the entire sample, hedging using the multivariate hedge ratio reduces RMSE by only 9.8%. The two Merton model hedge ratios reduce the volatility by around 5%.
Results across rating classes in Panel A are consistent with the overall sample. Although hedge ratios tends to perform better for lower rated firms than higher rated for all the four models, the maximum reduction in volatility through hedging is less than 10%. Sub-period results reported in Panels B to D provide consistent results. The maximum reduction in volatility of 12% (using the multivariate hedge ratio) occurs in the 2008-09 -the period corresponding to the most volatility CDS markets. In the least volatile period corresponding to 2004-07, the RMSE reduces at most by 6%.
Indeed, hedging often increases volatility in sub-samples. For example, across the entire sample period, the Merton model hedge ratios increase volatility for above investment grade firms. In Panel A, the RMSE for the hedged portfolio for A rated firms is about 6% higher than the unhedged portfolio when the extended Merton model hedge ratio is used to construct the hedge.
In summary, consistently across sub-samples and sub-periods, the equity hedge is of limited effectiveness in reducing the volatility of the CDS portfolio across all models. At best, across sub-samples, the reduction in volatility is 12%. At worst, hedging increases volatility of the CDS portfolio compared with leaving the portfolio unhedged.
Out of Sample Empirical Hedge Ratio
The empirically estimated sensitivities that we used to construct the hedge cannot be used in practice as these were estimated from in-sample. How do out-of-sample hedge ratios perform? To check, we estimate the hedge ratio from a rolling regression over the previous one year. Using the previous one year not only allows us to check the out-of-sample usefulness of the empirical hedge ratio, but also allows a fairer comparison with the Merton model.
The results, reported in Table 5 , are not encouraging. Hedging reduces RMSE across all firms by only 5.38% -less than the reduction observed when the hedge ratio was esti- 
Alternative Measure of Risk
The RMSE may not be the appropriate risk measure, especially when the distribution of hedging errors does not follow a normal distribution. In Figure 2 In summary, the conclusions using VaR are consistent with those using the RMSE.
Hedging credit risk in the equity markets is of limited effectiveness across the entire sample, although the Merton model performs creditably in comparison with the in-sample estimated empirical sensitivity.
Our results indicate that hedging in the equity market is of limited effectiveness in reducing the volatility or VaR of a CDS market-maker. The ineffectiveness of the equity hedge is not because of model risk as the performance of the Merton model is about the same order of magnitude as the in-sample estimated hedge ratio, and is often even superior. We now investigate the relative importance of the two alternative explanations.
Cumulative Hedging Error
One possible explanation is that equity and credit markets are not well integrated over short horizons. For example, there could be lead-lag relationships between the equity and credit markets (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) . In addition, there could be transient mispricing (Kapadia and Pu, 2011) .If the lack of integration between equity and credit markets over short horizons is partly responsible for the poor performance of the hedge, then the performance of the equity hedge should improve when errors are aggregated over longer horizons.
To investigate, we consider cumulative hedging errors over horizons longer than one day.
Specifically, at a time t, we hedge the equally weighted portfolio of CDS contracts with equity, and make no additional trade until t + T . At t + T , the position is closed out and the cumulative hedging error over the T -day period is computed as,
Results for horizons corresponding to T ∈ {5, 10, 25, 50} are reported in table 7. As would be expected, the magnitude of RMSE increases with horizon. The rate of increase is slightly greater than √ T possibly because the hedge is not rebalanced daily. For example, the RMSE of the unhedged portfolio over a 50 (25) business day horizon is 3.16 (2.42) times that of the RMSE over 5 business days. In contrast to the previous results for daily volatility, each of the four hedge ratios are effective in reducing the RMSE. For example, hedging using the extended Merton model reduces RMSE by around 17% for a horizon of 5 business days, and 21% for the 10-day horizon. The hedge ratio from the classical Merton model also shows similar magnitudes of effectiveness. It is interesting to note that the hedge ratio from univariate regression provide the best performance now, even though it works relatively poorly in daily hedging.
Our results indicate that much of the improvement in hedging effectiveness occurs over a short period. Using the hedge ratio estimated from the univariate regression, the decline in RMSE is about 20% within 5-days, and increases only to 31% over 50-days. Figure 3 plots the RMSE of the cumulative hedging error from one to 10 days in Panel A, and shows the effectiveness of hedge in Panel B. There is a steep improvement in the effectiveness of the hedge from 1-day to 4-days, and then a slower improvement for longer horizons upto 10 days and beyond.
Overall, the results suggest that short-term pricing discrepancies play a role in making the equity hedge ineffective. As equity and credit markets are better integrated over longer horizons, the equity hedge is more effective. However, the equity hedge reduces volatility by only about 30% at best when using empirical hedge ratio. Thus, it is clear that mispricing
is not the only explanation of the ineffectiveness of the hedge.
Low Correlation between CDS spread and stock return
The ineffectiveness of hedging may be because other variables, besides the equity, also impact credit spreads. To compare the relative importance of factors determining credit spread changes, we run the monthly regression of CDS spread change over six sets of variables for each firm. The six sets of independent variabels are stock return, change in quasi-market leverage and equity volatility, change in VIX, change in VIX and market return, change in 10-year treasury rate and slope of yield curve. Panel A in Table 8 reports the median adjusted R 2 across each rating class and the whole sample.
Stock return itself only explains 13% of time-series variation in CDS spread for the whole sample. Across rating classes, the explanatory power ranges from about 9% for the highest rated firms to 21% for the lowest-rated firms. Surprisingly, VIX and market return together are more powerful than the underlying stock return in explaining variation of CDS spreads with an adjusted R 2 is 22% across all firms. Moreover, across all rating classes, the VIX and index have higher explanatory power than the underlying stock return. Indeed, the market return and VIX are together more important than any other set of variables in determining credit spread changes.
Do these additional variables explain hedging ineffectiveness? To address this question, we estimate a time-series regression in the monthly RMSE on changes on a set of market variables, including the two interest rates, the VIX and market return. The monthly RMSE in month m is computed using the daily hedging errors of portfolio during that month as follows,
where |m| is the number of days in month m, e t is defined in equation 15. Although we report results only for the hedge ratio from the classical Merton model, the extended Merton model hedge ratio gives similar results.
Panel B in Table 8 reports the results. Across the whole sample, these four variables together explain 34.8% variation in the monthly RMSE. The RMSE is significantly related to changes in the slope of the yield curve consistent the predictions of recent structural models that indicate credit spreads should be dependent on the business cycle (e.g., Hackbarth, The most consistently significant variable, however, are not interests rates but the VIX.
Across all firms, changes in the VIX is significant at the highest level. The sign of the coefficient is positive indicating that an increase in the VIX increases the RMSE. Moreover, the VIX is also significant for three of the four categories of rating classes. In summary, it is clear that the VIX plays an important role in explaining both the variability of credit spreads and hedging effectiveness.
It is far more difficult to understand why the VIX plays such an important role. Given that the VIX is related to market fears, the results suggests that the credit markets price in an additional market-wide risk that is not fully captured at the level of the firm.
Conclusion
We examine whether credit risk can be hedged in the equity market from the viewpoint of a financial institution making markets in credit default swaps. Our surprising finding is that hedging in the equity markets is of limited effectiveness in reducing the volatility of a CDS portfolio at a daily frequency. Over our entire sample, hedging in the equity market reduce daily volatility about 10%. Moreover, in sub-samples, hedging can increase the RMSE.
The lack of effectiveness is not because of model risk as the Merton model hedge ratios are similar to the hedge ratios based on the empirical observed sensitivity of CDS spread to stock return.
Instead, we find support for two alternative explanations. First, hedging effectiveness increases over longer horizons, indicating that the lack of integration between equity and credit markets over short horizons plays a role in reducing hedging effectiveness. Although the effectiveness of the equity hedge increases, the reduction in the volatility is only about 30% relative to the unhedged portfolio. Second, we find that the correlation between credit spread and stock return is not only low on average, but that it is lower than the correlation of credit spreads with market return and market volatility. In particular, changes in the VIX index plays an economically and statistically important role in determining not only credit spread changes but also hedging effectiveness. Overall, our results indicate that both explanations are economically important.
Although we have attempted to distinguish between the two explanations, it is possible that both explanations are related. Credit derivatives, as opposed to other derivative markets, appear to be especially sensitive to mispricing because of the significant costs associated with arbitrage. But one significant cost, as we noted, is the risk associated with implementing an arbitrage. Given that credit spread changes are susceptible to market wide fears, there is an increased risk of arbitrage, thus making it more likely to have persistent pricing errors.
In summary, the credit markets appear to be unique in the risks they pose to marketmakers. Moreover, given that the increased risk is positively related to market fears, marketmakers in the credit default swap markets are also likely to be a source of systemic risk.
Regulators need to be cognizant of the special risk posed by market-making in the CDS market. This table reports summary statistics of spreads, sensitivities and hedge ratios calculated using the Merton models for each rating class and the whole sample. Spread (bps) is the credit spread computed with Merton model. Sensitivity is the spread change per unit of stock return which is computed from equation (5) for the classic Merton, and from equation (10) for the extended Merton. The hedge ratio (dollars) is the amount of equity required to hedge one CDS contract of notional of $10 mm, and is equal to the product of the sensitivity and duration. The time-series mean and standard deviation are reported here. This table reports the estimate of the empirical hedge ratio, δ e j,t = β j D j,t . β j is the slope coefficient from a panel regression of equation (12) and equation (14), respectively, for rating j. Fixed effect is allowed here. The duration D j,t is computed at the average observed CDS spread of rating j on each date. Panel A reports the time-series average of duration ($) and hedge ratios ($). Panel B reports the estimate of the slope coefficient β h j in hedge ratio regression 17 for rating j. The null hypothesis is β h j = 1, which means Merton hedge ratio is in line with those empirically observed. t-stat is calculated with the clustered standard error. Panel A in this table reports the median Adjusted R 2 in firm-by-firm regression of change in CDS spread on six sets of independent variables. ∆r E,i,t is the stock return of firm i in month t; ∆lev i,t is the change in quasi-market leverage; ∆vol E,i,t is the change in equity volatility; ∆r 10 t is monthly change in 10-year Treasury rate; ∆slope t is the monthly change in slope of the yield curve, which is 10-year Treasury rate minus 1-year Treasury rate; ∆V IX t is monthly change in VIX; r m,t is the market return, which is measured with S&P return. Panel B reports the regression result of monthly RMSE over a set of non-equity market variables. The dependent variable is the change in monthly RMSE, which is constructed using the hedging errors of Extended Merton hedge ratios. The Newey-West standard error is used to calculate t-stat and number of lags is 3. 
